REGULATORY RATIONING: A SOLUTION TO HEALTH
CARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
ROBERT H. BLANKt
INTRODUCTION

Despite all the recent controversy, rationing has always been a
part of medical decision making. Figure I presents a spectrum of
ways in which health care can be rationed. Whether imposed by a
market system in which price determines access, a triage system
where care is distributed on the basis of need defined largely by the
medical community, or a queue system in which time and the
waiting process become the major rationing device, medical
resources have always been distributed according to criteria that
contain varying degrees of subjectivity. In almost all instances,
rationing criteria are grounded in a particular value context that
results in an inequitable distribution of resources based on social as
well as strictly medical considerations.
In addition to illustrating the range of rationing options for
health care, Figure I introduces yet another complexion in defining
the concept. Some forms of rationing infer or necessitate government involvement, either direct or indirect, while others fail to
distinguish between private and public sector choices. This
distinction is critical to a clarification of how current health care
options differ from past ones. Less explicit forms of rationing
toward the top of the figure are no longer sufficient to resolve
health care dilemmas in this era. As a result, we are now witnessing
a shift toward the bottom end of the spectrum, possibly culminating
in a central role for the government in the rationing of increasingly
scarce medical resources. Although explicit rationing under the
authority of the government is but one form of rationing, there
appear to be many forces that, concurrently, are moving American
society in that direction. At the same time, however, explicit public
rationing is feared by some observers, who suggest that rationing is
1
unnecessary or an anathema to be avoided at all costs.
t Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of Canterbury, Christchurch,
New Zealand. Purdue University, A.B. 1965; University of Maryland, M.A. 1969,
Ph.D. 1971.
1See Arthur L. Caplan, How Should Values Count in the Allocation of New
Technologies in Health Care?, in IN SEARCH OF EQUITY: HEALTH NEEDS AND THE
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 95, 97 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 1983) (noting that the health
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FIGURE I
FORMS OF HEALTH CARE RATIONING
FORM

CRITERIA USED

Physician Discretion

Medical benefit to patient
Medical risk to patient
Social class or mental capacity

Competitive
Marketplace

Ability to pay

Insurance
Marketplace

Ability to pay for insurance
Group membership
Employment

Socialized Insurance
(i.e., Medicaid)

Entitlement
Means test

Legal

Litigation to gain access & treatment

Personal Fundraising

Support of social organizations
Skill in public relations
Willingness to appeal to public

Implicit rationing

Queuing
Limited manpower & facilities
Medical benefits to patient with
consideration of social costs

Explicit Rationing

Triage
Medical benefits to patient with
emphasis on social costs and
benefits

Controlled Rationing

Government control of medicine
Equity in access to primary care
Social benefit over specific patient
benefits
Cost to society

Instead of focusing on whether some form of rationing is
necessary, the debate should be directed toward the extent to which
the government and its agents ought to take a direct role in
establishing rationing procedures and structure.
Should the

care crisis is largely an artifact of quantification techniques such as cost benefit
analysis); see also RITA RICARDO-CAMPBELL, THE ECONOMICS AND PoLrrIcs OF HEALTH

266-86 (1982) (explaining that the major problem in health care today is overregulation); Norman G. Levinsky, Age as a CriterionforRationingHealth Care, 322 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1813, 1814 (1990).
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haphazard, inequitable, and often contradictory private rationing
continue, or should the government accept responsibility for the
allocation and use of medical resources and take active steps to
design and implement a comprehensive rationing system? I argue
that the government has this responsibility and must soon act upon
it if a health care crisis is to be averted.
Despite the strong antipathy toward the concept of rationing in
the United States, the rationing of medical technologies will become
more prevalent and explicit. 2 George Annas is correct in suggesting that the customary approach to rationing medicine, which is
practiced by health care providers but not explicitly acknowledged,
gives us the illusion that we do not have to make these choices, but
it does so only at the cost of mass deception.3 This deception, in
turn, has contributed to the misconception that as a society we can
avoid explicit rationing decisions because we have managed to do
so thus far. Some observers still argue that there is no need to deny
even the best medical technology to anyone if only we eliminate
unnecessary services and facilities. 4 It is natural, when faced with
such painful choices, to take solace in approaches that appear to
free us from those decisions. It is becoming increasingly clear,
however, that American society can no longer dodge the problems
of rationing. Although some persons remain content with the
illusions of the customary approach, high technology medicine
accompanied by the array of demographic and social trends,
including an aging population and heightened public demands,
5
make that impossible.
2 See ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 26-27 (1988); see also DANIEL
CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 123-26 (1987)
(discussing the "inevitability" of the need for rationing decisions and the near
certainty that "demand for health care will... outstrip available resources"); PAUL
T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE 3-19
(1990) (offeringjustifications of rationing on economic efficiency grounds).
3 See George J. Annas, The Prostitute, the Playboy, and the Poet: RationingSchemes
for Organ Transplantation,75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 187, 187 (1985) (stating that the
decision by Congress in 1972 to fund kidney treatment simply postponed the time
when identical decisions had to be made about candidates for heart and liver

transplants).
4 See Arnold S. Relman, Is RationingInevitable?,322 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1809, 1810
(1990).
' Elderly persons are the leading users of hospital care and have the highest per
capita expenditures for health care. See INsTITuTE OF MEDICINE, EXTENDING LIFE,
ENHANCING LIFE: A NATIONAL RESEARCH AGENDA ON AGING 7 (Edmund T. Lonergan
ed., 1991). In 1987 the cost to provide health care for elderly patients was $162
billion, or $5360 per capita. See id. By the year 2040, middlerange estimates suggest
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The most appropriate question today is not whether rationing
ought to be done (it always has been) but, rather, what form it
should take and how we can establish equitable and reasonable
procedures. To this end, a public dialogue over societal goals and
priorities that includes consideration of the preferred agents for
rationing medical resources must be initiated. This initial enterprise could take the form of Lester Milbrath's Council for Long
Range Societal Guidance, a standing government commission, or
6
other proposed mechanisms.
Although a consensus on how medical resources ought to be
distributed is unlikely, it may be possible to reach general agreement on the procedures through which society will approach these
problems. If we can agree that the decisional criteria are fair and
understand that we are bound by them, specific applications,
although difficult, might be perceived as unfortunate rather than
unfair. One of the reasons individuals and health care providers
tend to reject the notion of rationing or any attempt to withhold
treatment is that there is no guarantee that the resources not
allocated will be used fairly or even more efficiently. If one person
forgoes a needed liver transplant, the beneficiary of the rationing
will probably be someone else who will have the transplant7
someone perhaps who is less "deserving."
that the elderly population will more than double in size. See Edward L. Schneider
& Jack M. Guralnik, The Aging of America: Impact on Health Care Costs, 263 JAMA
2335, 2337 (1990). Persons over 85 now constitute about one-sixth of the total
elderly, a proportion that is increasing in part because of the intensive expenditure
for medical care during that stage of life; it is estimated that by the year 2010 the
number of elderly aged 85 and over will increase by about 50%. See id. "By 2040, the
average age of a baby boomer will be 85 years, and the level of Medicare spending
for the population 65 years and above could range from $147 to $212 billion (in 1987
dollars)." Id.
6 See LESTER W. MILBRATH, ENvISIONING A SUSTAINABLE SocIETY: LEARNING OUR

WAY OUT 288-96 (1989) (recommending the creation of a council that ensures longrange future planning because existing governmental institutions are too busy with
urgent problems). The Milbrath Council, a part of national government, would
engage in long-range forecasting and develop possible future scenarios. See id. at 289.
It would also monitor conditions and changes in society, facilitate social learning,
enhance citizen dialogue and thinking about the issues, and make recommendations
to public officials based on thorough research and deep thought. Milbrath conceives
of the council as composed of twenty-one generalists who have demonstrated a high
capacity of thinking about broad social issues. These generalists, however, would be
aided by two or more competing forecasting teams and adequate staffing to ensure
an open flow of information and ideas. See id. at 293.
7 See Norman Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States is So Hard:
Cost Containmen Justice, and ProviderAutonomy, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1383
(1986).

1992]

REGULATORY RATIONING

1577

This Article proceeds by first examining the value context which
includes a strong emphasis on individual lifestyle choice even when
it leads to ill health, the right to unlimited health care, and the
unrealistic dependence on technology to fix our health problems.
Because this value system so effectively works against setting limits,
constraints must be imposed from outside. This Article then
reviews the marketplace approach which many observers support
and finds it lacking. The intensifying health care crisis within the
context of this fragmented combination of private-public funding,
it is argued, calls for a more systematic regulatory approach if we
are to have an equitable, efficient, and workable rationing system.
Although it is unlikely that the single payer regulatory model
presented here will fully resolve this crisis, the time is ripe for a
comprehensive, and controversial, move toward a national-level,
regulatory approach.
I. THE LIBERAL VALUES SYSTEM: RIGHTS VS. RESPONSIBILITY
A. Individual Rights

Among the major difficulties in establishing a workable
rationing system in the United States are the deeply imbedded
values that oppose setting limits to health care. Americans depend
heavily on the liberal tradition and emphasize individual autonomy,
self-determination, and a shared belief in the value of the individual;
individuals ought to be free to determine their preferred lifestyle
and then, as long as they do not directly harm others, to live it, even
if it is self-destructive. Within this value context, even the suggestion that individuals have a responsibility to live a healthy life for
their own good and that of the community is attacked as "victim
blaming" or "blatant paternalism" and contrary to individual choice.
The shift in the burden of disease, from infectious diseases that
required major societal efforts to control toward diseases linked to
individual behavior, presents a serious challenge to this value of
lifestyle choice, however. For instance, the Secretary of the Health
and Human Services, Louis Sullivan, concludes that "[b]etter control
of fewer than ten risk factors ... could prevent between 40 and 70
percent of all premature deaths, a third of all cases of acute
disability, and two thirds of all cases of chronic disability."8 The
8 Louis W. Sullivan, HealthyPeople 2000, 323 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1065, 1066 (1990).
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obstacle that any strategy of risk control faces is the radical change
that would be required in many individuals' behavior.
In addition to placing a high priority on individual lifestyle
choice, American society heavily emphasizes the individual's right
to medical care. Even if in the aggregate we are willing to cut costs,
when it comes to the individual patient, we often expend all
available resources without consideration of cost. There is a not-soimplicit assumption that every person has a right to unlimited
expenditure on his/her behalf, despite our knowledge that in the
aggregate this is not feasible. 9 The problem of unlimited individual
claims in the context of limited societal resources has produced the
present health care dilemma.
Further complications arise because the distribution of medical
resources is skewed toward a very small proportion of the population. Increasingly, medical resources have been concentrated on a
relatively small number of patients in acute care settings. In 1980,
13% of the patients in a study accounted for as much hospital
billing as the other 87%, and the most costly 10% of patients
consumed between 42% and 47% of total billings. 10 Substantial
questions about the just distribution of scarce societal resources are
thereby accentuated in the establishment of biomedical priorities.
The emphasis on the individual's right to medical care is also
reflected in the patient-physician relationship, which is viewed
largely as a private one, beyond the public realm. Supposedly, this
relationship is immune from economics and reflects a technological
imperative, where technologies are to be used even if they are of
marginal or questionable benefit to the patient. This relationship,
combined with the value of individual rights and a great faith in the
power of technology, makes patients likely to go to court when
anything goes wrong. In turn, this pattern leads to the practice of
defensive medicine and an even greater reliance and utilization of
sophisticated and expensive diagnostic tests, some of which offer

9 See Harvard Community Health Plan, The LORAN Commission: A Report to the
Community, in 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL POLICY 64, 77 (Robert H. Blank &

Andrea L. Bonnicksen eds., 1992) (finding that in response to a question in the
survey conducted for the commission, over 90% of the respondents agreed that
"everyone should have the right to the best possible medical care-as good as the
treatment a millionaire gets" and that 51% "refused to set any monetary limit-even
up to $5 million-on what should be spent in the attempt to save a life").
10 See ChristopherJ. Zook & Francis D. Moore, High-Cost Users of MedicalCare, 302
NEW ENG.J. MED. 996, 997 (1980).
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little proven efficacy. Moreover, a few highly publicized megasettlements reinforce expectations and escalate this cycle.
B. Technology: High Demand & High Cost
Americans are also predisposed toward progress through
technological means. We have developed an unrealistic dependence
on technology to fix our health problems at the expense of
preventive health care approaches. In our value system it is
arguably easier to look for the quick technological fix than it is to
alter individual behavior to prevent disease, or at least to reduce the
risk, in the first place. As a society, we have come to expect the
best that medical science can offer for -ourselves and our loved
11
ones.
These public expectations and perceptions of medicine have
resulted in an over-utilization of, and reliance on, technology in
American medical practice. Patients demand access to the newest
technologies because they are convinced of their value. Popular
health-oriented magazines and television shows extol the virtues of
medical innovations. Physicians have been trained in the technological imperative, which holds that a technology should be used
despite its cost if it offers any possibility of benefit.
Although we complain about the high cost, when our health is
at stake, we expect no expense to be spared. The preferred solution
for many consumers is simply to shift the basis of payment to the
government or private third-party payers. These demands clearly
prevent any simple solution to the problems of health care.
Reinforcing this maximalist approach to medical care, we have
created a complicated array of mechanisms for minimizing the
amount any single individual will pay for these benefits. Private
health insurance allows individuals to protect themselves by
spreading the risk of expensive medical treatment across many
persons. The real cost of the services is thus obscured because
individuals seldom bear the costs directly or fully. This insulation
of the individual patient from cost encourages the maximalist
approach and supports the presumption that cost should not be a
concern in the treatment of the patient. No matter how much is
1 Despite the enormous cost for very little return either in quality or length of
life, there are strong pressures for intensive intervention on the individual basis even
in the last days of life.
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spent on the patient, a large part of the payment will usually be
made by the amorphous third-party payer.
As a result of all these factors, the United States has largely
avoided making the difficult decisions regarding the distribution of
scarce medical resources. Most often the "solutions" have merely
shifted costs from the individual to the government (or vice versa),
or from one third-party agent to another. Aaron and Schwartz, for
instance, question the policy makers in the 1980s who relied on a
shift toward prospective reimbursement schemes to solve health cost
problems. 12 Although giving the appearance of resolving the
problem, these alterations only delay the need to make even harder
choices in the future. These interim shifts in the burden of payment
fail to deal with the critical issues of establishing policy priorities
and setting limits on the use of high-cost medical technologies. To
some extent, recent proposals for health care reform are misguided
because they do not recognize that, no matter how we organize and
fund the health care system, we cannot pay for the type of health
care now expected by Americans. i3 Unless policy makers are
willing to take a stand and limit extravagant health care, the
financial burden on future generations will escalate dangerously.
C. Implicationsfor RationingPolicy
The belief that individuals have the right to unlimited medical
care, the traditional acceptance of the maximalist approach by the
medical community, and the insulation of the individual from
feeling the cost of treatment, have placed severe limits on the extent
to which proscription of expensive and often ineffective interven12 See HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION:
RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE 114-15 (1984).
13 For a sampling of some of these proposals, see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N,
HEALTH ACCESS AMERICA: THE AMA PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE,
QUALITY HEALTH CARE (1991); NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMM'N ON HEALTH CARE,
FOR THE HEALTH OF A NATION: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (1989); THE PEPPER
COMM'N, A CALL FOR ACTION (1990); and also see A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR

AMERICA (Stuart M. Butler & Edmund F. Haislmaier eds., 1989) [hereinafter
NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM] (proposal by the Heritage Foundation); Ronald S. Bronow
et al., The Physicians Who Care Plan: PreservingQuality and Equitability in American
Medicine, 265JAMA 2511 (1991) (proposals by Physicians Who Care); Rashi Fein, The
Health Security Partnership: A Federal-State Universal Insurance and Cost-Containment
Program, 265 JAMA 2555 (1991) (proposal by the Committee for National Health
Insurance); and Birt Harvey, A Proposalto ProvideHealth Insuranceto All Childrenand
All PregnantWomen, 323 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1216 (1990) (proposals by the American
Academy of Pediatrics).
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tion is possible. Any limits on the rationing of medical technologies,
therefore, must come from outside the health care system because there are
no inbuilt limits, either in the public or the health care community. The
only agent with the authority to influence public values and, thus, create
a framework for setting limits, is the government.
Any rationing policy must take into account these multiple
pressures from the providers and the consumers as well as the
constraints imposed by demographic factors and the structure of the
government itself. Many of the unique problems encountered in
the United States can be traced to the absence of any single locus
of power for making health care decisions and the fragmented,
decentralized policy process. As long as there continues to be no
one single accountable institution for making difficult choices, they
will not be made in any systematic way.
Attempts to ration medicine by edict, particularly if they involve
lifestyle changes, will be painful and acrimonious in a society that
stresses the predominance of individual rights. Moderation of the
expectations, demands, and behavior of a public that has come to
expect unlimited access to technological progress in medicine will
not be an easy task. As noted by David Mechanic, even though it
may be that the public has developed unrealistic expectations, it is
"unlikely that the American population would support the rationing
of expensive high technology in the fashion characterizing England's
National Health Service." 14 Moreover, because office holders gain
no immediate political credit for trying to convince people that they
are largely responsible for their own health problems, one can
hardly expect most elected officials to publicly advocate an explicit
rationing policy. Elections and careers are lost, not won, on such
issues. Being called a visionary is little comfort to the official who
loses reelection for advocating unpopular reforms. The difficulty
of the issue, however, should not reduce the urgent need to face it.
A central element in any effort to ration medical resources in a
fair and efficient manner is education designed to counter the
technological imperative. Without a countervailing emphasis on the
risks and dangers inherent in each proposed medical intervention,
we will continue to embrace the technologies. Our failure to assess
realistically the limits of medicine and the long-term consequences
of high technology interventions and to communicate this assess14 DAVID MECHANIC, FROM ADVOCACYTO ALLOCATION: THE EvOLVING AMERICAN

HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 215 (1986).
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ment to the public, produces a situation where intervention occurs
first and serious contemplation of its advisability second, after the
fact.' 5 Engelhardt and Rie are correct in their assertion that
society must determine the point at which "undesirable" limits on
health care are "simply unfortunate, but not unfair in the sense of
16
constituting a claim on further resources."
The government has a responsibility to educate the public both
as to the links between lifestyle choices and health, and the need to
moderate expectations. This educative approach must be accompanied by a significant shift at the allocation level toward preventive
and primary health care programs, which recently have received
shrinking shares of the health care resources-.17 This pursuit will
be difficult, in part because of the momentum toward more
profitable curative/rescue medicine and in part because of the
strength of prevailing perceptions of health care. Unfortunately,
high-technology interventions continue to receive more emphasis
8
than does preventive education.'
The most controversial aspect of rationing medicine is the
necessity of a shift toward individual responsibility for health status.
Given the large proportion of health care expended on illnesses that
are linked to lifestyle choice, 19 however, any rationing policy, if it
15 The strong value bias in favor of technological fixes, combined with the
inherent dramatic nature of many technological interventions, has led to a hesitancy
by agencies charged with medical technology assessment to reject the technologies
and recommend against their development and diffusion. See Robert H. Blank, The

Limits of Biomedical Technology Assessment, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND POLTCS:
POLICY ANALYSIS IN CONGRESS 116 (Gary Bryner ed., forthcoming 1992); Harvard
Community Health Plan, supra note 9, at 67 (stating that "[n]ewer, more expensive
interventions are often adopted without systematic effort to determine whether the
new technology is better than existing alternatives").
16 H. Tristram Engelhardt & Michael A. Rie, Intensive Care Units, Scarce Resources,
and ConflictingPrinciples ofJustice, 255 JAMA 1159, 1159 (1986).
17 See DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS

264 (1990) (suggesting that the health care system should focus "on enhancing quality
of life rather than holding off death, or on means of preventing illness and reducing
the debilities of old age rather than on high-technology cures, or on enhancing the
general level of public health rather than on the special curative needs of individuals").
18 Ongoing decisions by many providers, including some states and Medicare, to

fund heart and liver transplants indicate that forces against such a transformation are
potent. Cf J. Michael McGinnis, National Prioritiesin DiseasePrevention, ISSUES SCI.
& TECH., Winter 1988-89, at 46, 49 (stating that "a leap forward in the ability to
deliver preventive health services to individuals cannot happen without changes in the
way Americans pay for health care" because the largest share of the huge sum spent
on health care goes for treatment, not prevention).
19See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1066 (noting that better control of fewer than ten
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is to be effective, must place considerable emphasis on the ultimate
responsibility of the individual, not only for his or her own health,
but also for reducing the overall costs to society. In the words of
Louis Sullivan, "Health care professionals and policymakers need to
create a climate of personal responsibility ...

to establish funda-

mental, positive steps to help meet national goals." 20
Only by
creating this climate of personal responsibility can the following
otherwise incompatible goals be achieved: increasing the span of
healthy life, reducing disparities in health care among various
population groups, and ensuring access to preventive services for all
Americans.
More importantly, in an era of increasingly scarce resources
where medical goods and services are rationed, the debate will
intensify over the extent to which individual behavior ought to
influence rationing decisions. Although the ethical controversy over
this question will not abate, economic policy necessitates movement
in that direction. According to philosopher H. Tristram Engelhardt:
It will also be morally acceptable for a society, if it pursues
expensive life-saving treatment, to exclude persons who through
their own choices increase the cost of care.... There is no
invidious discrimination against persons in setting a limit to
coverage or in precluding
coverage if the costs are increased
21
through free choice.
Instillation of a future-oriented perspective both for individual
health and societal survival is critical. Milbrath has noted: "There
will be little meaning to political freedom, or freedom of choice, if
our society fails to prepare for predictable crises ....

"22

Al-

though the emphasis on individual responsibility for health does
conflict with prevailing notions of free choice in a liberal society,
failure to recognize the problem and take action now, even at the
expense of some freedom of choice, risks the loss of considerably
more freedom in the future. Mandatory constraints on the use of
medical resources will increasingly result in decisions not to initiate
risk factors "could prevent between 40 and 70 percent of all premature deaths, a third
of all cases of acute disability, and two-thirds of all cases of chronic disability"); see
also McGinnis, supra note 18, at 46 (noting that, in contrast, "technologically oriented
medical treatment currently promises to reduce premature morbidity and mortality
by no more than perhaps 10 to 15 percent").
20 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1065-66.
21 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Shattuck Lecture: AllocatingScarceMedical Resources and

the Availability of Organ Transplantation,311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 66, 70 (1984).
22 MILBRATH, supra note 6, at 301.
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lifesaving treatment. Although such decisions have always been
made, they have never been the product of an explicit rationing
policy.
As stated earlier, the success of any effort to construct meaningful rationing policy hinges on our ability to moderate the expectations and demands of both the providers and users of health care.
Although there are ways through which policy makers can influence
the incentive structure and thus moderate expectations, in the end
it is the consumers and providers who must realize that they are the
keys to resolving the burgeoning health crisis. In a society that
emphasizes self-gratification, materialistic values, and immediate
pleasure, behavior changes necessary to improve health may be
especially unpleasant and unsatisfying and, thereby, require
considerable self-denial. Conversely, a healthy lifestyle might mean
foregoing habits that are enjoyable to many people and largely
23
viewed as critical components of free choice.
This analysis illustrates the need for a collective, centralized
initiative to shift the emphasis toward healthy lifestyles. Although
individuals have some degree of freedom in such choices, the
greater capacity to curb unhealthy habits and develop healthy ones
lies at the societal level. At a minimum this requires placing the
goal of health at least on par with that of enjoyment. To do this the
incentive structure operating within society must be radically revised
to better reward the healthful lifestyle choices of individual
members; this can only be done through government intervention.
A major part of this effort must be aimed at reducing the expectations of the public regarding the availability of health care resources
and thereby reducing the unrealistic demand for unlimited use of
curative medicine. Society must realize the necessity for limits and
end the fatuous assumption of unlimited resources.
II. ROLE OF PROVIDERS IN RATIONING

Although the government alone has the means to initiate and
coordinate necessary action, no health program can be successful
without the support of physicians, hospitals, and other health care
providers. Physicians, in particular, are key decision makers on the
demand side of medicine: they serve as conduits for access to
treatment regimens, technologies, and drugs. Relatively subjective
23 It is especially difficult to convince young people to forego unhealthy pleasures
when the potential benefits might not appear for many decades.
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decisions by physicians about patients' needs determine the demand
for expensive intensive care treatment and tend to become
institutionalized in the need formulas of hospitals and planning
agencies. 24 Any attempts by the government to require physicians
to ration medical care on the grounds of societal rather than patient
good conflicts with professional ethics and the traditional patientphysician relationship.2 5 Pellegrino argues that attempts to make
the physician the designated guardian or gatekeeper of society's
resources are "morally unsound and factually suspect." 26 Similarly,
physician Erich Loewy concludes that economic considerations as
they affect either the patient, the hospital, or society are "not
germane to ethical medical practice" and that "[i]t is dangerous to
introduce extraneous factors into medical decisions." 27 Allen Dyer
answers "anemphatic 'No'" to the question of whether the physician
should be society's agent in reducing health costs and concludes
that rationing decisions should not be made by doctors at the
bedside, because their primary responsibility is to the patient, not
28
to society.
Despite these caveats, the medical profession increasingly will
find itself in the uncomfortable position of responding to government initiatives and, eventually, regulatory pressures to systematize
difficult rationing decisions. Although the shift toward public
allocation is a clear threat to traditional medical ethics, Lundberg
asks, rhetorically, how long physicians can continue to make such
29
difficult policy judgments in response to short-term pressures.
Can this piecemeal rationing process continue to dominate, in light
of the extensive social investment riding on each decision?
Other observers contend that the medical profession must take
responsibility for evaluating expensive new medical technologies
and procedures prior to their being made available to consumers,
since these prior allocation decisions "virtually always precede
24 See Albert G. Mulley, The Allocation of Resources for Medical Intensive Care, in
SECURING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE 285, 300 (President's Comm'n for the Study of

Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ed., 1983).
25 See Allen R. Dyer, Should Doctors Cut Costs at the Bedside?: Patients,Not Costs,
Come First, 16 HASTINGs CENTER REP. 5, 5 (1986) (stating that the emphasis on cost
containment threatens the traditional doctor-patient relationship).
26 Edmund D. Pellegrino, RationingHealthCare: The Ethicsof Medical Gatekeeping,

2J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 24 (1986).
27 Erich H. Loewy, Cost Should Not Be a Factorin Medical Care, 302 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 697, 697 (1980).
28 See Dyer, supra note 25, at 6.
29 See George D. Lundberg, RationingHuman Life, 249JAMA 2223, 2224 (1983).
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rationing decisions."30 Although Robert Veatch contends that the
general public, not clinicians, ought to make allocation decisions, he
points out that "[i]f cost containment is not on the clinicians'
agenda, it would have to be on someone else's." 3 1 According to
John Ashley: "Rationing is painful. Rationing does reduce costs by
obviating the demand for allocation of resources. As our society
demands that we avoid these costs, physicians should be intimately
involved in the allocation and rationing decisions made both at the
system and at the hospital level."32 Because of their crucial role
as the point of access to health care, doctors must be active participants in the rationing of medical services. No longer do the health
care providers automatically have a claim to all the societal
resources they believe might benefit their patients, nor should they
be able to make decisions without an awareness of the complex
ramifications for the health care system as a whole. As uncomfortable as this shift is for the medical profession, it is already apparent
(apart from any efforts at government involvement in the rationing
of medical care) as evidenced by trends toward corporate health
care, health maintenance organizations (and the increase of these
organizations), and the increased rationing role of benefits
managers for large employers.

III. FAILURE OF THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE
Many of the most vocal critics of the regulatory model of health
care are those persons who favor continuation of the free enterprise, marketplace model.8 8 Fundamentally, they argue that the
health care system is a large business and that, if left alone to
operate according to the principles of supply and demand, it will
Regulation, it is contended,
best serve the consumer public.
interferes with the effective operation of the marketplace and
creates artificial inequities in the system.
30 William A. Knaus, RationingJusticeand the American Physician,255JAMA 1176,
1176 (1986).
Sl Robert M. Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Reallocation of Resources, 16 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 32, 38 (1986).

32 John T. Ashley, The Allocation andRationingoffHigh-CostServices, 256JAMA 350,
350 (1986).
33 See, e.g., Jack A. Meyer, Health Care Policy: HistoricalBackground and Recent
Developments, in INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH PoLICY:

BROADENING THE

DEBATE 8 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1985) (presenting his view that "it is regulatory overkill
for states to establish the rates at which all payers reimburse hospitals").
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The fallacy of this approach is that the health care market
contains none of the self-selecting mechanisms that work to check
market excesses. In fact, if health care operated as a conventional
market, "[w]e would be no more concerned about the proportion of
the [GNP] consumed by health care than we [would] about the
34
proportion of [GNP] spent on transportation, housing, or shoes."
In order for an efficient, market-based health care system to work,
several conditions are essential. First, decisions must be made by
the consumers. Second, the consumers must know the value and
costs of the goods they are contemplating purchasing. Third, the
consumers must pay the full cost and receive the full value of the
are absent from the
goods they choose to buy. All three conditions
5
current market for health care services.3
First, medical decisions are seldom made by the patient.
Although some discretion is possible, the traditional physicianpatient relationship is based on the trust and ultimate dependence

of the patient on the expertise of the physician, often under
uncertain circumstances. The individual patient's choice is heavily
conditioned and constrained by the providers of health care.
Health care is not a commodity in any traditional market sense
precisely because the patient cannot make his or her choice
independent of these nonmarket forces.
Second, most patients have a difficult time judging the care they
buy. As noted earlier, the health care providers have enormous
discretion in deciding both the type and cost of care provided. 6
The specialized knowledge required for the dispensation of health
care, in conjunction with the emotional and often urgent nature of
medical decisions, undercuts the patient's ability to be a rational
shopper. It is unrealistic to expect consumers to become sophistiof the
cated, cost effective purchasers of health care, in part because
37
steep learning curve in shopping for value in health care.
34 David M. Eddy, What Do We Do About Costs?, 264JAMA 1161, 1165 (1990).
35 See id.
36 See supra text accompanying note 24.
37 Moreover, it does not follow that more informed consumers of health care will

buy for lower cost. In fact, evidence suggests that knowledge often leads to higher
costs because "[p]atients with more knowledge tend to be more demanding in terms
of tests and treatments they want for themselves." DEAN C. CODDINGTON ET AL., THE
CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE: COSTS, CHOICES, AND STRATEGIES 271 (1991). Demand for
health care is inelastic for most consumers because an increase in price does not lead

to significant decrease in the amount of services demanded. Patients want the best
care regardless of cost and, when given a free choice, usually opt for the most
technological and expensive form of health care.
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Third, the major reason that patients are unlikely to be frugal
consumers, as assumed by marketplace models, results from the
failure to meet the third condition. Third-party payment, whether
private or public, assures that the potential consumer who receives
the value pays only a fraction of the costs, if any. Under this
incentive structure, it is "well known that people consume more
when they do not pay the full cost of something than they would
8
consume if they did pay the full cost."
Many proponents of market-based models would attempt to
encourage consumer cost consciousness by either fine tuning
(through increased co-payments, deductibles, etc.) or creating major
alterations in the incentive structure. The Heritage Foundation
proposal, for instance, shifts health care decision making to
consumers through tax credits and a legal obligation on all families
to obtain at least a minimum level of insurance protection.3 9 The
proposal argues that "[b]y purchasing their insurance themselves...
Americans would become more sensitive to the cost of health
insurance," and, thereby, more cost conscious. 40 Enthoven and
Kronick advance a less radical proposal that would have employees
pay the difference between employer contributions (80 percent) and
the cost of their chosen plan. 4 1 Although Enthoven and Kronick
are certainly correct in their contention that this incremental
approach would be more compatible with American values than a
publicly financed and administered model, its success would depend
on the capacity to counteract Americans' heightened expectations
for evermore expensive medical treatment and actually reduce costs.
We are past the point of incremental, piecemeal "solutions" to
the health care crisis. The current market, a fragmented combination of private-public funding, is inequitable, inefficient, and costly.
Recent studies have demonstrated that administrative costs of the
present system are unconscionably high, particularly in the private
sector. For example:
The U.S. government, much maligned for its inefficiency, does a
far betterjob than commercial insurance companies when it comes
38 Eddy, supra note 34, at 1169.
39 Stuart M. Butler & Edmund F. Haislmaier, Introduction to NATIONAL HEALTH
SYSTEM, supra note 13, at v, vii.
40 Edmund F. Haisimaier, Health Carefor Workers and TheirFamilies,in NATIONAL
HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 55, 58.
41 See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Planfor the
1990s: UniversalHealth Insurancein a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy
(Firstof Two Parts), 320 NEw ENG.J. MED. 29, 32 (1989).
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to efficiently administering health care programs .... If the private
health insurance industry were as efficient as the U.S. Medicare
42

system, consumers would save over $13 billion each year.
For every dollar the health insurance industry paid in claims in
1988, it spent 33.5 cents for administration, marketing, and other
overhead expenses. 43 This is fourteen times higher than the 2.3
cents it cost Medicare to provide one dollar of benefits and eleven
times higher than the 3.0 cents it cost the Canadian health syscosts intem. 44 Furthermore, between 1981 and 1988, these
45
creased even faster than health care costs themselves.
In addition to the administrative costs, a system with over 1500
different payers places severe burdens on providers, employers, and
patients. Because each insurer has its own unique forms, administrative paper work consumes eighteen percent of an average
46
hospital's budget, and has become a major cost for practitioners.
Moreover, businesses are forced to employ fulltime health care
administrators to manage coverage and health benefit consultants
to find the most acceptable policies. The instability in the current
payer system also forces employers to continually shop around for
47
more affordable policies, resulting in a high annual turnover.
These constant changes also present problems for the employees,
who are often caught in the middle without coverage due to preexisting conditions and other inconsistencies between policies.
IV.

SINGLE-PAYER, REGULATORY MODEL

A single-payer plan available to all persons would dramatically
simplify the processing of claims, reduce duplication of insurance
monitoring or providers, and thereby rationalize a very confusing

process for all parties. By spreading the risks across the entire
population, a single-payer system would also eliminate cost shifting,
a principle destabilizing factor and the "major culprit ultimately
Robert M. Brandon et al., Premiums Without Benefits: Waste and Inefficiency in
the Commercial Health InsuranceIndustiy, 21 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVICES 265, 276-77
(1991).
42

43 See id. at 272.
44 See id. at 276-77.
41 See id. at 267 (noting that overhead costs increased 93%, while the increases in
premiums sold was 73% and benefits paid was 77%).
46 See id. at 270.
47 It has been estimated that one-third of all small businesses leave their insurance
company or are not renewed each year. See id.
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48
behind the growing number of working uninsured Americans."
According to one study:

[W]e have situations in which 60 to 70 percent of all patients, or
more in some instances, are not paying the full price for services
received. If the typical hospital is going to operate profitably, the
remaining 30 to 40 percent of the patients served must pay premium rates high enough to cover those patients receiving services at
49
discounts.

This situation is patently unfair and further undermines the myth
of a free market in the delivery of health care.
Opponents of a single-payer system argue that it is unworkable
in our market-driven health system, takes away freedom to choose,
stifles medical innovation, and is impossible to implement.50 It is
also argued that such a system would be inequitable because only
the wealthy would be able to escape its grasp by circumventing the
system.5 1
Although the single-payer regulatory model would
manifest all of these problems to some extent and is not a panacea,
given the disequilibrium of the current system, it offers the best
hope of a fair, equitable, and efficient approach to rationing. One
commentator has noted "[c]urrent health policies have failed" and
their continuation is certain to exacerbate an already bleak
situation. 52 As recent as a decade ago, the arguments of the
opponents of the regulatory model would have had substantially
more merit than they do today. We are now, however, "beginning
to recognize the need for a deeper structural response to a world
that is qualitatively different from what it was [then]."5 3 Crisis
situations demand hard decisions and drastic action.
Given the unrealistic expectations and demands of the public,
the intrinsically limitless capacity of medical progress to expand and
escalate our definition of "need," 54 and the inability of a fragment48 CODDINGTON ET AL., supra note 37, at 23.
49 Id. at 36.
50 See RichardJ. Arnould & Charles B. Van Vorst, Supply Responses to Market and
Regulatory Forces in Health Care, in INCENTIVES vs. CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY:
BROADENING THE DEBATE, supra note 33, at 107.
51 See id. at 128.
52 Howard Waitzkin, Why It!s Time for a National Health Program in the United
States, 150 W.J. MED. 101, 106 (1989).
53 Stephen M. Shortell & WalterJ. McNerney, Criteriaand GuidelinesforReforming
-the U.S. Health Care System, 322 NEw ENG.J. MED. 463, 463 (1990).
54 See Daniel Callahan, RationingMedical Progress: The Way to Affordable Health
Care, 322 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1810, 1812 (1990) (stating that the definition of "need"
is expanded in the pursuit of further progress to meet every human need).
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ed health care system to set limits, only a centralized authority will
be able to make the hard, binding decisions that future rationing
requires. Ironically, many of the persons who now argue against a
regulatory model of rationing consistently have denied that any
form of rationing is needed. Michael Reagan, for instance,
contends that rationing really amounts to "income discrimination in
the provision of health services" and argues instead for a strategy of
"greater medical effectiveness." 55
Not surprisingly, many of the critics of the regulatory model
point to the past failures of regulation, which, concededly, are
numerous. Although the lack of a consistent, comprehensive, and
rational regulatory effort is subject to valid criticism, the model
itself is not. The United States has not had a prospective, futureoriented regulatory approach, but a patchwork, damage-control
approach. Politics, not courage and anticipatory thinking, has been
the central motivation in past regulatory efforts. The need for a fair
and workable rationing policy now urgently requires vigorous,
forceful, and bold national guidance. I agree with Davies and
Felder who argue that "[i]ncreased health care rationing in the next
decade is inevitable, yet it must not be done with quick fixes, shortterm solutions, and patchwork reform of our present system. That
would create worse problems for health care in the 21st century
"56

There have been some optimistic signs that Congress is
awakening to the problems discussed here. One component of the
Senate Democrats' proposal was the emphasis on eliminating
unnecessary medical procedures. 57 Although the plan did not
specify what this might include, it recommended setting national
treatment guidelines for physicians and promoting the use of health
maintenance organizations. Under the Democrats' proposal, a new
federal agency would be created to set national health care spending
targets and negotiate national hospital and physician rates. If all
5 Michael D. Reagan, Health Care Rationing and Cost Containment are Not
Synonymous,
9 POL'Y STUD. REV. 219, 228 (1990).
56
Nicholas E. Davies & Louis H. Felder, Applying Brakes to the Runaway American
Health Care System, 263JAMA 73, 73 (1990).
57 This plan was drafted over a two-year period under the direction of Majority
Leader George Mitchell and unveiled at a news conference on June 5, 1991. See
Richard A. Knox, Senate Democrats Unveil UniversalHealth CarePlan,BOSTON GLOBE,
June 6, 1991, at National/Foreign 1 (stating that nearly half of the projected savings
under the plan would come from eliminating unnecessary medical care through
stepped up doctors guidelines).
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parties to the negotiations, including providers and consumers,
agreed to the rates, they would become binding. Although no
reference was made to the concept of rationing per se, the relevance
of this new agency to such efforts is significant.
More directly, Davies and Felder have proposed creation of "a
national commission to study how best our nation can ration health
care in the least onerous fashion in both the public and private
sectors."5 8 This bipartisan commission "would be charged with
looking globally at the American health care system, both in the
short and the long terms, and ...

righting the wrongs.., that have

59
crept incrementally into the system during the past forty years."
They argue that for national rationing of health care to be done
fairly, there must be national guidelines-a national ethics policy
60
that is defensible on grounds of consistency.
The Canadian health care system has recently sparked considerable interest and debate as an alternative to explicit rationing that
might be useful in the United States. The Physicians for a National
Health Program, for example, has proposed a plan through which
all Americans would be covered under a publicly administered, taxfinanced national health program.6 ' One single public payer in
each state, locally controlled but subject to stringent national
standards, would replace all the public and private insurers that now
exist. This unitary administrative program, which has strong
similarities to the Canadian system, would avowedly save tens of
billions of dollars a year in administrative costs alone. More
importantly, it would put into place the mechanism for a regulatory
model of rationing.
In response to the criticism that moves to a single-payer system,
with universal comprehensive coverage and a cost control situation
similar to the Canadian system, would lead to unacceptable levels of
conflict, Evans and his associates argue that while it might be harder
to find the villain in the current U.S. system, "corporate competitors
or employers may turn out to be more ruthless than public
regulators." 62
Cost control, and certainly rationing, involve

58 Davies & Felder, supra note 56, at 73.
59 Id. at 74.

60 See id.
61 See Kevin Grumbach et al., Liberal Benefits, ConservativeSpending: The Physicians

for a National Health ProgramProposal,265 JAMA 2549, 2549 (1991) (proposing "a
single, comprehensive public insurance program without co-payments or deductibles
and with free choice of provider").
62 Robert G. Evans et al., ControllingHealthExpenditures-TheCanadianReality, 320
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conflict between providers and payers in any system. Political
processes focus this conflict, whereas market processes diffuse it,
but do not necessarily reduce it. According to Evans, however, "the
stylized political combat in Canada may result in less intrusion on
the professional autonomy of 63the individual physician than is
occurring in the United States."
Although the evidence on this contrast is not yet in, it is
important because it shows that however rationing is carried out,
conflict is inevitable. Moves toward a single-payer regulatory
approach might initially be more painful and contentious, but in the
long run, once the ground rules are established, it might be less
stressful to the various parties. One of the complaints often heard
among medical practitioners is that they could learn to live with a
regulatory model if only the regulations were comprehensible,
consistent, and stable, qualities now lacking throughout the health
care system.
Whatever regulatory approach to rationing is implemented,
Congress, with strong administrative support, will have to take
action. There is presently strong support for some form of
democratic approach to rationing, such as that being carried out in
Oregon over the last several years. In addition, any regulatory
strategy must ensure widespread public input at some stage.
Because of the intense value bias in favor of technological fixes,
individual rights, and life style choice, however, it is unlikely that
the democratic model is appropriate for such a volatile issue as
rationing. This does not preclude the need for an open, national
dialogue, including all interested groups and individuals, detailing
the desirable, broad social priorities. The idea that health policy,
particularly rationing, should be made through referenda or other
democratic mechanisms, however worthy it sounds, is infeasible.
Health care rationing might be one of those public issues that
is best dealt with in negotiations outside of the public spotlight.
Paul Light calls these issues, which usually involve cutting benefits
or raising taxes, "dedistributive," and argues that they cannot be
resolved in the public forum because they elicit insurmountable
opposition from powerful interests on many sides.6 4 Light argues
NEW ENG.J. MED. 571, 576 (1989).
6

3 Id. at 571.

64 PAUL LIGHT, ARTFUL WORK: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 15
(1985) (stating that there is a great temptation to avoid action on dedistributive issues
because of the electoral risks).

1594

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW

[Vol. 140:1573

that the opportunity for closed-door negotiation must be returned
to Congress and advocates the use of bipartisan commissions for
that purpose. 65 Such commissions act mainly as fronts for secret
bargains made between the President and congressional leaders and
circumvent the need to debate and defend the various alternatives
in public. Just as the Commission on Social Security Reform
provided an opportunity to build a compromise, wrap it in a
bipartisan flag, and drive it through Congress, so Congress might
deal with the painful and politically explosive issue of rationing.
Although I have argued elsewhere against this approach as a
means of legitimizing deception by government leaders, circumventing the democratic process, and being counter-productive in the
long run, 66 a multifaceted approach using a national commission
to debate the question of social goals and priorities followed by a
bipartisan commission to design the regulatory framework might
now be appropriate. If an enlightened, authoritative, and highly
visible national commission could ascertain societal health care
goals, it would be politically more feasible to use a bipartisan
commission to make the difficult political decisions that follow.
We must devise a rationing scheme that is industry-wide, not
solely applicable to public programs. Unless rationing standards are
uniform, the tiered system of health care will be solidified, thus
reverting back to the current inequitable, inconsistent rationing
approach. The assumption that the private sector will voluntarily
conform to the lead of the public sector because the public sector
represents forty percent of health care spending has been demonstrated to be fallacious by the institution of diagnosis-related groups
67
(DRGs) in the 1980s.
Furthermore, regulation will prove effective only if there are
significant sanctions and penalties to conform to the established
treatment standards. 68
Physicians who knowingly exceed the
standards by ordering unnecessary diagnostic tests and unapproved
See id. at 237.
66 See BLANK, supra note 2, at 185.
65

67 See CALLAHAN, supra note 17, at 78 (noting that the "DRG system has so far
mainly shifted the costs from one sector to another, with no apparent net gain in
savings").
68 See Callahan, supra note 54, at 1811; see also A. Everette James et al., The
Diffusion of Medical Technology: Free Enterpriseand Regulatoy Models in the U.S.A., 17

J. MED. ETHICS 150, 154 (1991) (agreeing that regulation is only effective with
penalties, but that we must be cautious that the penalties do not compromise patient
welfare).
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treatments bear the burden of proof for showing good reason for
the breach of policy. This will force unpleasant choices and raise
strong objections from health care providers initially, but if
implemented in conjunction with a shift in public values toward a
preventive/primary care strategy where equity is paramount, in the
long run the current unfairness of market-based, decentralized
rationing will be reduced.
CONCLUSION

An affluent society such as the United States should be able to
provide good primary health care for all citizens, or at least for all
citizens who make a minimal effort to reduce unwarranted health
risks in their lives. Obviously, defining what this guaranteed
primary health care should be depends on the resources available
nationwide for health care. This, in turn, depends on the answer to
two questions: how much money is society willing or capable of
committing to health care? and what are our priorities for distribution of these funds so as to provide an equitable base of primary
care for all citizens? Only after these decisions are made can we
make reasonable choices as to how much we are willing to raise the
level of health care. In other words, once we have met the goal of
providing access to primary care on as equitable a basis as possible,
any remaining funds should be used to expand the base and pursue
ambitious life-extending programs.
Short of a fully single-payer national health system that
guarantees access while providing strict incentives for the use of
effective and cost-efficient health care services, a two-pronged
strategy of value change and tightened regulation of protocol
treatment is essential. First, we need a national education effort to
instill the value of individual responsibility for health and convince
the public that we must learn to live with a less expansive health
care system and a less expansive idea of health. This national
dialogue should include a thorough reevaluation of the current
value system and the health care structure it has shaped. As a
society, we must come to realize that in order to sustain a system
with finite resources, we can no longer expect unlimited health care.
The longer it takes to come to this realization, the more difficult
rationing will ultimately be.
Second, we need to institute a centralized regulatory system of
rationing scarce health care resources that addresses the long-term
goals of equity, cost-containment, and accountability. Congress and
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the Administration have a duty to put aside their ideological
baggage and work together with representatives of major private
and public stakeholders to begin to fashion a workable mechanism
for regulating the health care system. Likewise, the health care
providers and private third-party payers have a responsibility to be
active, constructive players in restructuring the health care system
and shaping rationing regulations. The time for unmitigated selfinterest must yield to this broader social responsibility in time of
crisis. Ideally, this rationing system would be administered under
national guidelines by the states in cooperation with the powerful
private sector. Realistically, a strong federal regulatory agency is
needed to "motivate" compliance with national rationing standards
that apply universally to the public and private sectors.
Although moves to this end initially are bound to ignite intense
controversy, particularly in the medical marketplace, the heightening disaster in health care funding demands decisive action. If such
action is not forthcoming, continuation of the status quo will lead
to a "tyranny of our own making" through which we will "impoverish ourselves and successive generations by indulging in too much
medicine." 69 A regulatory model will be difficult to implement
and is unlikely to resolve the crisis by itself; nonetheless, the
inability of the current allocation system to set limits necessitates
vigorous governmental intervention.

69 CarlJ. Schramm, Can We Solve the Hospital-CostProblem in Our Democracy?,311
NEw ENG. J. MED. 729, 732 (1984).

